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WRIGHT IS STILL WRONG: THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
REFORM ACT AND AIRLINE COMPETITION
AT DALLAS LOVE FIELD
BARRET V. ARMBRUSTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 2006, CONGRESS REFORMED THE LAW known as the“Wright Amendment.”1 The Wright Amendment, passed in
1979, restricted flights from Dallas Love Field Airport (Love
Field) to destinations within Texas and its four contiguous
neighboring states.2 The purpose of the Wright Amendment was
to protect a then nascent Dallas/Fort Worth International Air-
port (DFW) from allegedly harmful competition at Love Field.3
Over the next twenty-five years, the restrictions of the Wright
Amendment were slowly relaxed to permit selective service to
certain destinations.4 However, in the summer of 2006, South-
west Airlines (Southwest), American Airlines (American), DFW,
and the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth issued a joint statement
urging repeal of the Wright Amendment.5 Their statement was
* Barret V. Armbruster, J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017;
B.A., Government, The College of William & Mary, 2010. The author would like
to thank my wife, Carolyn, for her support and encouragement. The author
would also like to thank Tim Springer for his suggestions on this comment.
1 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat. 2011
(2006).
2 See International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48–49 (1980).
3 City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2069-K, 2016 WL 98604, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016).
4 See id.
5 Contract Among the City of Dallas, the City of Fort Worth, Southwest Airlines
Co., American Airlines, Inc., and DFW International Airport Board Incorporat-
ing the Substance of the Terms of the June 15, 2006 Joint Statement Between the
Parties to Resolve the “Wright Amendment” Issues 2–3 (July 11, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Five Party Agreement], http://www.dallas-lovefield.com/pdf/dal_Resolve
WrightAmendment.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FGJ-25AC].
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quickly adopted by Congress and passed into law as the Wright
Amendment Reform Act (WARA) in the fall of 2006.6
In addition to repealing the Wright Amendment, WARA
places some significant restrictions on Love Field.7 WARA pro-
hibits nonstop international flights from the airport and, most
importantly, requires a reduction in the number of gates from
thirty-two to twenty.8 WARA also includes “a significant amount
of language likely aimed at thwarting any antitrust lawsuits.”9
To date, antitrust litigation against the parties that originally
conceived WARA has been dismissed, leaving the validity of the
statute unresolved.10 Nonetheless, Dallas, Southwest, Delta Air
Lines (Delta), and almost every other airline that operates at
Love Field are currently litigating the allocation of Love Field’s
limited gate space in federal court.11 On January 8, 2016, Judge
Ed Kinkeade ruled on Delta’s motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion barring Southwest from evicting Delta from Love Field. The
ruling granted Delta’s request and preserved the status quo at
Love Field for now.12 However, it will take a trial, and many
more years of litigation, to determine the respective rights of the
airlines vying for the limited number of gates at Love Field.
This comment considers the first year of WARA’s enactment
and whether the Wright Amendment has been sufficiently re-
formed to benefit airline passengers both in the Dallas-Fort
Worth area and around the country. Accordingly, Part II will
discuss the history of Love Field, DFW, the Wright Amendment,
and WARA. Part III will examine the competition issues created
by WARA, using Delta’s request for accommodation at Love
Field and the resulting litigation as a case study. Part IV will ex-
plore the various avenues by which WARA might be legally chal-
lenged. Part IV will also include an analysis of the
6 See Wright Amendment Reform Act.
7 See id. §§ 3, 5.
8 Id.
9 John Grantham, A Free Bird Sings the Song of the Caged: Southwest Airlines’ Fight
to Repeal the Wright Amendment, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 429, 455 (2007).
10 See Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dallas, 527 F. Supp. 2d 538 (N.D.
Tex. 2007) (dismissing antitrust claims of leaseholders, whose facilities were
decommissioned under the WARA gate reduction, for failure to state a claim).
11 See City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2069-K, 2016 WL 98604,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016).
12 See id. As of the date of publication of this comment, Southwest’s appeal of
Judge Kinkeade’s decision of January 8, 2016, remains pending before the Fifth
Circuit. See City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 16-10051 (5th Cir. Jan. 20,
2016).
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constitutionality of WARA, the viability of antitrust litigation
under WARA, and possible contract or tort claims that might
loosen WARA’s grip on airline competition at Love Field. Part V
will urge the repeal of WARA and the end of Congress’s med-
dling at Love Field. This final section will also look to another
multi-airport city for guidance as to how DFW and Love Field
might coexist while still allowing Love Field to grow.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history of the troubles at Love Field can be traced to the
genesis and growth of another airport: DFW. Dallas and Fort
Worth engaged in a heated rivalry to dominate commercial avia-
tion in North Texas for much of the twentieth century.13 How-
ever, at the suggestion of the now defunct Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the cities came together in the 1960s to create “a
single . . . airport for the Dallas-Fort Worth . . . region.”14 The
new airport, DFW, opened in 1974.15 However, when Southwest
subsequently planned to expand its operations out of neighbor-
ing Love Field, Congress passed the Wright Amendment out of
concern that the competition would hobble DFW.16 This quest
to find an appropriate competitive balance between DFW and
Love Field spurred the subsequent easing of the Wright Amend-
ment’s restrictions on Love Field and the eventual reformation
of the Wright Amendment in its entirety.
A. LOVE FIELD, DFW, AND THE EARLY DAYS OF SOUTHWEST
Competition between Dallas and Fort Worth in the transpor-
tation arena dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century,
when the cities jostled for the affection of the railroads.17 Ac-
cordingly, when civil aviation came to North Texas, the two cit-
ies established their own respective airfields: Meacham Field in
13 City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Tex. 1973)
(“For many years the Cities of Dallas and Fort Worth were engaged in a fierce,
intense[,] and sometimes bitter rivalry for the business of commercial aviation
and commercial air carriers.”), aff’d, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974); see Grantham,
supra note 9, at 432–33.
14 TODD B. TATELMAN & JOHN W. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32984,
DALLAS LOVE FIELD: THE WRIGHT AND SHELBY AMENDMENTS 1 (2005).
15 Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *1.
16 Id.
17 See DR. STANLEY H. SCOTT & LEVI H. DAVIS, A GIANT IN TEXAS: A HISTORY OF
THE DALLAS-FORT WORTH REGIONAL AIRPORT CONTROVERSY 1911-1974, at 2
(1974).
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Fort Worth and Love Field in Dallas.18 Rapid advances in aircraft
technology during the first part of the twentieth century made it
unnecessary to have two expanding airfields within thirty miles
of each other, so national and state aviation authorities later
sought to broker a deal between the two cities and form a single
regional airport that could accommodate the larger landing
sites required for modern aircraft.19 Dallas and Fort Worth did
agree on a potential location for the new airport at the midpoint
between the two cities, but Dallas withdrew from the venture in
the 1940s, thereby scuttling negotiations to create the jointly op-
erated regional airport.20 With Meacham Field no longer able to
accommodate all of the city’s commercial aviation needs, Fort
Worth later unilaterally established its own new airport, Amon
Carter Field, near the proposed midway site for the still unreal-
ized regional airfield.21
Meanwhile, Love Field grew.22 Though Dallas continued to
tussle with Fort Worth over the primacy of the region’s air-
fields,23 the city and several airlines invested in expanding Love
Field’s footprint, building a new terminal, extending runways,
and modernizing the airport’s existing facilities. “These im-
provements indicated that Love was a busy, modern airport.”24
After Amon Carter Field failed to take flight, Fort Worth officials
renewed their efforts to establish a regional airport that would
service both cities.25
In 1962, the CAB finally heeded Fort Worth’s entreaties for
the federal agency to intervene in the Dallas-Fort Worth area’s
airport quandary.26 The CAB ordered one of the airlines servic-
ing the area to provide an additional round-trip flight out of
Amon Carter Field and launched an investigation of the re-
gion’s air travel facilities and needs.27 Hearings for the investiga-
tion commenced in 1963.28 In 1964, the CAB unanimously ruled
18 Id. at 2–3.
19 Id. at 3, 5.
20 Id. at 6–9.
21 Id. at 11, 20–21.
22 See id. at 28.
23 Id. (noting “the beginning of an almost endless fight between Dallas and
Fort Worth”).
24 Id. at 34–35.
25 See id. at 35, 39.
26 See id. at 42–43.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 46.
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that the region required a new aviation facility.29 By 1965, Dallas
and Fort Worth agreed to build the new regional airport, DFW,
midway between the two cities.30
To ensure the success of DFW, the two cities sought to bind
the airlines to move their operations to the new facility.31 Ac-
cordingly, the cities obtained agreements with each airline ser-
vicing the market at the time.32 The agreements provided that
the airlines would move all of their flights in and out of the re-
gion to DFW.33 While Love Field would not be completely aban-
doned, it remained unclear what use the airport might serve
after the airlines moved to DFW.34 The uncertainty of Love
Field’s status was further muddled by the arrival of Southwest in
1971.35
Southwest began as a small intrastate carrier flying between
only three cities in Texas: Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio.36
Despite the plan for all other carriers to move from Love Field
to DFW upon the completion of the latter, Southwest informed
the DFW airport authorities that it would not join the other car-
riers at DFW.37 The decision prompted Dallas, Fort Worth, and
DFW to sue Southwest in federal court, claiming that the CAB’s
1964 ruling bound the plaintiffs to force Southwest to move to
DFW with the other commercial carriers.38 However, the trial
court found that the CAB’s decision did not bind the cities, the
airport, or an intrastate carrier like Southwest.39 Accordingly,
the court permitted the still-budding Southwest to continue op-
erating its intra-Texas flights out of Love Field while the other
airlines prepared to move to DFW.40
29 Id. at 49.
30 Id.
31 See Grantham, supra note 9, at 437–38.
32 Id. at 437.
33 Id.
34 See id. at 438.
35 See id. at 438–39.
36 Southwest Corporate Fact Sheet, SOUTHWEST, http://www.swamedia.com/chan-
nels/Corporate-Fact-Sheet/pages/corporate-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/7U66-
KGUV].
37 City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (N.D. Tex. 1973),
aff’d, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1974).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1022.
40 See id. at 1035.
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B. THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
Southwest continued to operate as an intrastate carrier until
Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) in 1978.41
Congress promulgated the ADA “to encourage, develop, and at-
tain an air transportation system which relies on competitive
market forces to determine the quality, variety, and price of air
services.”42 As the ADA removed the federal government’s hold
on regulating interstate air travel, Southwest quickly added in-
terstate routes to its flight schedule.43
However, Southwest’s expansion to destinations outside of
Texas renewed fears that Southwest’s activity at Love Field
would deflect passengers from using DFW.44 Fort Worth officials
particularly feared that the prospect of Southwest’s interstate
success at Love Field would draw other airlines to abandon
DFW, thereby depriving the citizens of Fort Worth of a regional
airport close to their city.45 Among those who shared these fears
was Fort Worth Congressman Jim Wright, then Majority Leader
of the House of Representatives.46
To prevent Southwest and Love Field from competing with
DFW, Wright tacked on an amendment to the International Air
Transportation Competition Act.47 Initial iterations of the
amendment completely barred Love Field from hosting any in-
terstate flights.48 But after Southwest rallied support in the Sen-
ate, Congress eventually adopted a version of the amendment
that did not completely restrict interstate travel from Love
Field.49 The final amendment read:
41 Eric A. Allen, The Wright Amendment: The Constitutionality and Propriety of the
Restrictions on Dallas Love Field, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 1011, 1017 (1990).
42 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
“The ADA essentially removed government control from the airline industry and
stripped the CAB from its power to regulate routes and fares.” Grantham, supra
note 9, at 441 n.90.
43 Grantham, supra note 9, at 440–41.
44 Allen, supra note 41, at 1018.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1018–19; Grantham, supra note 9, at 441.
47 See International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48–49 (1980); 125 CONG. REC. 32,148–50 (1979).
48 See H.R. 5481, 96th Cong. § 29 (1979); H.R. REP. NO. 96-602, at 9 (1979);
125 CONG. REC. 32,149.
49 Allen, supra note 41, at 1019; Grantham, supra note 9, at 441; see H.R. REP.
NO. 96-716, at 24–26 (1979) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78,
86–88.
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(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), notwithstanding any other
provision of law, neither the Secretary of Transportation, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, nor any other office or employee of the
United States shall issue, reissue, amend, revise, or otherwise
modify (either by action or inaction) any certificate or other au-
thority to permit or otherwise authorize any person to provide the trans-
portation of individuals, by air, as a common carrier for compensation or
hire between Love Field, Texas, and one or more points outside the State
of Texas, except (1) charter air transportation not to exceed ten
flights per month, and (2) air transportation provided by com-
muter airlines operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of 56
passengers or less.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (c), notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, or any certificate or other author-
ity heretofore or hereafter issued thereunder, no person shall
provide or offer to provide the transportation of individuals, by
air, for compensation or hire as a common carrier between Love
Field, Texas, and one or more points outside the State of Texas,
except that a person providing service to a point outside of Texas
from Love Field on November 1, 1979, may continue to provide
service to such point.
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect to, and it is
found consistent with the public convenience and necessity to
authorize, transportation of individuals, by air, on a flight between
Love Field, Texas, and one or more points within the States of Louisiana,
Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas by an air carrier, if (1)
such air carrier does not offer or provide any through service or ticketing
with another air carrier or foreign air carrier, and (2) such air carrier
does not offer for sale transportation to or from, and the flight or aircraft
does not serve, any point which is outside any such State. Nothing in
this subsection shall be construed to give authority not otherwise
provided by law to the Secretary of Transportation, the Civil Aer-
onautics Board, any other officer or employee of the United
States, or any other person.
(d) This section shall not take effect if enacted after the enact-
ment of the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979.50
Wright’s amendment was henceforth known as the Wright
Amendment.51 The Wright Amendment restricted any carrier
operating out of Love Field to either intrastate flights or inter-
state flights to one of the four states that share a contiguous
border with Texas.52 If the carrier flew to one of those four con-
tiguous states, it could not provide “through service or ticketing”
50 International Air Transportation Competition Act § 29 (emphasis added).
51 Grantham, supra note 9, at 441.
52 International Air Transportation Competition Act § 29(c).
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with another carrier or offer tickets to or from another state
outside of those four contiguous states and Texas.53 Despite the
restrictive nature of the Wright Amendment, Southwest seemed
untroubled by the legislation when it was passed.54
The Wright Amendment stood unchanged for more than fif-
teen years until Congress passed the Shelby Amendment in
1997.55 Prompted by a Department of Transportation (DOT)
opinion considering the Wright Amendment’s exception56 for
aircraft configured to carry fewer than fifty-six passengers,57 the
Shelby Amendment clarified that “the term ‘passenger capacity
of 56 passengers or less’ includes any aircraft, except aircraft ex-
ceeding gross aircraft weight of 300,000 pounds.”58 Curiously,
the Shelby Amendment also added three additional states to the
list of destinations to which aircraft could fly from Love Field:
Kansas, Alabama, and Mississippi.59 Unfortunately, the legisla-
tive history behind the Shelby Amendment does not include
Congress’s reasoning for clarifying and easing the restrictions of
the Wright Amendment.60 Congress revisited the Wright
Amendment less than a decade after the Shelby Amendment
with WARA.61
53 Id.
54 See Grantham, supra note 9, at 443–44 (“Prior to deregulation, Southwest
had boxed itself into the state of Texas from Love Field by refusing to comply
with the CAB order and requests of the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth and by
relying wholly on the authority of the [Texas Aeronautics Commission] to con-
duct its Love Field service. Faced with a House of Representatives who preferred
to restrict Southwest’s Love Field operation to the pre-deregulation boundary
lines of the State, when the Wright Amendment included provisions for interstate
travel, the airline seemed supportive of the Wright Amendment. Southwest was
now able to operate a ‘safe-harbor’ at convenient Love Field while other now
deregulated airlines were bound under the Letter Agreements at DFW.”).
55 TATELMAN & FISCHER, supra note 14, at 4.
56 See International Air Transportation Competition Act § 29(a)(2).
57 In 1996, Legend Airlines petitioned the DOT to permit the airline to fly
interstate routes from Love Field with airplanes that sat fifty-six passengers or less.
TATELMAN & FISCHER, supra note 14, at 4. The DOT’s Office of General Counsel
clarified that only those “aircraft that were originally configured to hold fewer
than 56 passengers” met the Wright Amendment restriction under § 29(a)(2). Id.
58 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of
1998, Pub. L. 105-66, § 337(a), 111 Stat. 1425, 1447 (1997).
59 Id. § 337(b).
60 TATELMAN & FISCHER, supra note 14, at 4.
61 See Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat.
2011 (2006).
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C. THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT REFORM ACT
For the first twenty years of the Wright Amendment’s exis-
tence, Southwest remained largely neutral as to whether the law
was sensible or not.62 However, in 2004, Southwest’s neutrality
ended.63 The airline started a media blitz to push Congress to
repeal the Wright Amendment, even threatening to move its
headquarters from Dallas if the Wright Amendment remained
in place.64 Southwest’s actions earned the airline a hearing
before the Senate,65 and Congress attempted to pacify what had
become the nation’s most profitable airline66 by adding Missouri
to the list of states to which Southwest could fly from Love
Field.67 However, despite this concession, Southwest continued
to press for a full repeal of the Wright Amendment.68
In 2006, Dallas, Fort Worth, DFW, Southwest, and American
convened to craft an amicable resolution to a quarter century of
restrictions at Love Field.69 The five parties’ collaboration pro-
duced an agreement (the Five Party Agreement) that proposed
a compromise by which the Wright Amendment might be re-
pealed.70 In exchange for lifting the geographic restrictions of
the Wright Amendment, the Five Party Agreement provided for
(1) reduction of the number of gates at Love Field from thirty-
two to twenty; (2) prohibitions on subdividing gates and loading
passengers by way of hardstands; (3) allocation of “preferential
use” gates between Southwest (sixteen gates), American (two
gates), and ExpressJet Airlines (ExpressJet) (two gates); (4) limi-
tations on flight operation hours; and (5) barring all interna-
tional flights from Love Field.71 Dallas, Fort Worth, DFW,
Southwest, and American presented the Five Party Agreement to
Congress in June of 2006.72
62 Grantham, supra note 9, at 452.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See The Wright Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 109th Cong. (2005).
66 TATELMAN & FISCHER, supra note 14, at 8.
67 Grantham, supra note 9, at 452–53; see Transportation, Treasury, Housing
and Urban Development, the Judiciary, and Independent Agencies Appropria-
tions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 181, 119 Stat. 2396, 2430 (2005).
68 Grantham, supra note 9, at 453.
69 City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2069-K, 2016 WL 98604, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016).
70 Id.
71 Id.; Grantham, supra note 9, at 453–54.
72 Grantham, supra note 9, at 453.
510 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
Congress adopted many of the provisions of the Five Party
Agreement when it passed WARA.73 First, WARA immediately
changed the flight restrictions at Love Field so that carriers
could through-ticket to and from any domestic or foreign desti-
nation, provided the flight to or from Love Field still routed
through one of the states originally authorized by the Wright
and Shelby Amendments.74 And second, all restrictions on do-
mestic air travel were scheduled to be lifted within eight years of
the passage of WARA.75
However, the Five Party Agreement imposed limits as well as
lifted them.76 Pursuant to Section 3 of WARA, carriers may not
offer nonstop flights to international destinations from Love
Field.77 Perhaps most importantly, Love Field’s number of gates
was slashed dramatically from thirty-two to twenty.78 WARA
grants the City of Dallas the authority to “determine the alloca-
tion of leased gates and manage Love Field in accordance with
contractual rights and obligations existing as of the effective
date of [WARA] for certificated air carriers providing scheduled
passenger service at Love Field on July 11, 2006.”79 Moreover,
WARA directs Dallas to “accommodate new entrant air carriers
. . . [by] honor[ing] the scarce resource provision of the existing
Love Field leases.”80
Congress passed WARA and repealed the Wright Amendment
on October 13, 2006.81 WARA provided a clear timeline for lift-
ing the flight restrictions that had burdened Love Field for
more than thirty-five years by October 2014.82
III. WHAT WRIGHT HATH WROUGHT: CITY OF DALLAS
V. DELTA AIRLINES, INC. AND THE GAME OF
MUSICAL CHAIRS AT LOVE FIELD
The repeal of the Wright Amendment and the October 2014
roll back of its restrictions on flights to or from Love Field were
73 Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *2.
74 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, § 2(a), 120
Stat. 2011, 2011 (2006).
75 Id. § 2(b).
76 See id. §§ 3, 5.
77 Id. § 3.
78 Id. § 5(a).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2069-K, 2016 WL 98604, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016).
82 See id.
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met with great enthusiasm.83 However, it quickly became appar-
ent that the new restrictions WARA imposed created new
problems at Love Field.84 As predicted by the airlines that were
not party to the Five Party Agreement, “the reduction of gates
combined with the guarantee to extend the leases held by Amer-
ican, Continental, and Southwest[ ] effectively shut out any
other airline from serving Love Field.”85 The stifling of airline
competition at Love Field in the wake of WARA was brought
into sharp focus when Delta sought accommodation for five of
its flights at the airport in 2014.86
A. GATE LEASES AT LOVE FIELD IN THE WAKE OF WARA
As noted supra, WARA reduces the number of gates at Love
Field from thirty-two to twenty.87 WARA further provides that
“Dallas . . . shall determine the allocation of leased gates and
manage Love Field in accordance with contractual rights and
obligations existing as of the effective date of this Act for certifi-
cated air carriers providing scheduled passenger service at Love
Field on July 11, 2006.”88 Accordingly, Dallas allocated the
twenty remaining gates at Love Field according to the distribu-
tion set forth in the Five Party Agreement: sixteen for South-
west, two for American, and two for ExpressJet.89
The gate rights allocated to the selected airlines under the
Five Party Agreement were termed “preferential use.”90 Though
“preferential use” was not defined in the Five Party Agree-
ment,91 the term was defined in the leases of the three airlines
that were leasing gate space at Love Field at the time of the Five
Party Agreement.92 The leases defined “preferential use” as
83 See Terry Maxon, It’s the End of the Wright Amendment at Dallas Love Field, DALL.
MORNING NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014, 6:35 AM), http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/
2014/10/its-the-end-of-the-wright-amendment-at-dallas-love-field.html/ [https://
perma.cc/39ZJ-59W6] (detailing the celebrations of Southwest and Virgin the
morning the restrictions lifted). The author of this comment also fondly remem-
bers the first time he could fly direct from Love Field to his childhood home
outside Washington, D.C., thereby avoiding the dreaded drive to DFW.
84 See Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *3–5.
85 Grantham, supra note 9, at 454.
86 See generally Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *3.
87 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, § 5(a), 120
Stat. 2011, 2012 (2006).
88 Id.
89 Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *2.
90 See Five Party Agreement, supra note 5, at 3.
91 Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *2.
92 Id.
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granting the lessee “primary, but not sole, use of the leased
space.”93
In the event that another airline seeks accommodation to fly
in or out of Love Field, WARA and the Five Party Agreement
govern the process.94 Specifically, WARA provides that, “[t]o ac-
commodate new entrant air carriers, the city of Dallas shall
honor the scarce resource provision of the existing Love Field
leases.”95 The Five Party Agreement addresses the topic as
follows:
To the extent a new entrant carrier seeks to enter Love Field, the
City of Dallas will seek voluntary accommodation from its ex-
isting carriers to accommodate the new entrant service. If the ex-
isting carriers are not able or are not willing to accommodate the
new entrant service, then the City of Dallas agrees to require the
sharing of preferential lease gates, pursuant to Dallas’[s] existing
lease agreements.96
The provisions of WARA and the Five Party Agreement that
speak to new entrant airline accommodation contemplate “the
possibility of Love Field facilities becoming a ‘scarce resource’”
after implementation of WARA’s gate restriction.97 Pursuant to
those provisions, Dallas’s leases with the airlines govern the pro-
cedure for accommodation.98 Fortunately, the terms of the lease
agreements between Dallas and the airlines are largely
identical.99
The lease agreements between Dallas and the airlines recog-
nize “the ‘need for open access and uniform treatment’” for
new entrant carriers, providing “a procedure . . . when accom-
modation is sought.”100 The procedure “requires [that] the Re-
questing Airline first exhaust all reasonable efforts to secure a
voluntary arrangement for accommodations” from the lessee air-
lines.101 If the new entrant’s “attempt for voluntary accommoda-
tion fails,” Dallas will notify the lessee airlines “that if a voluntary
accommodation is not made within the 30-day time frame” enu-
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, § 5(a), 120
Stat. 2011, 2012 (2006).
96 Five Party Agreement, supra note 5, at 3.
97 Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *3.
98 See Wright Amendment Reform Act § 5(a); Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at
*3; Five Party Agreement, supra note 5, at 3.
99 Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *3.
100 Id.
101 Id.
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merated under the lease agreements, Dallas will select one of
the lessees to accommodate the new entrant.102
B. DELTA SEEKS ACCOMMODATION
Of the three original airlines who signed leases for “preferen-
tial use” of the reduced number of gates at Love Field, only
Southwest remained by the fall of 2014 when the Wright
Amendment’s flight restrictions were fully rolled back.103 The
protracted efforts of Delta to gain access to Love Field illustrate
the difficulty of equitably allocating Love Field’s gates in this
new era.
In 2009, Delta subleased partial use of American’s two gates to
begin service from Love Field.104 However, Delta’s flights were
imperiled in October 2014 when Delta’s subleases expired and
American divested its two gates to Virgin America (Virgin).105
Accordingly, Delta notified Southwest, United Airlines
(United), and Virgin in June of 2014 “to request voluntary ac-
commodation for its five daily flights.”106 Delta’s efforts were un-
successful.107 Pursuant to the lessee airlines’ leases, Dallas’s
Department of Aviation Director, Mark Duebner, reached out to
the lessee airlines to notify them “that unless Delta was accom-
modated within 30 days, Mr. Duebner would select one [of the
lessee airlines] to comply with the accommodation order.”108
Since no lessee airline responded to Delta’s accommodation re-
quest, Delta began to execute “temporary gate usage agree-
ments” with various airlines at Love Field to continue its
service.109
In mid-September 2014, Dallas notified United that it had
been selected to accommodate Delta’s flights at its two gates.110
However, on the day before Dallas sent the notice, “United en-
tered into a gate usage agreement with Southwest for its use of
102 Id.
103 Id. at *2. Continental acquired ExpressJet and then merged with United. Id.
American divested its two gates to Virgin as a result of the American-U.S. Airways
merger. Id.






110 Id. at *4. “During this time, United was operating only seven daily flights
out of its two leased gates.” Id. Dallas chose United because of “United’s actual
gate usage at that time.” Id.
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United’s two gates only for overflow purposes or irregular opera-
tions.”111 Southwest disputed Dallas’s attempt to accommodate
Delta on the grounds that Southwest planned “to ‘ramp up’ its
[own] flight operations” using United’s two gates.112 After fur-
ther objections from United, Dallas withdrew its accommoda-
tion order.113 It later came to light that “Southwest offered $120
million cash consideration for the preferential use of both United
gates at Love Field, which was accepted by United on September
29, 2014.”114
Though initially rebuffed, Delta did not cease its efforts for
accommodation at Love Field.115 On October 2, 2014, Delta re-
newed its request for accommodation with Dallas.116 Accord-
ingly, Dallas began its rounds of accommodation requests to the
lessee airlines in December 2014.117 However, the result was the
same as before: none of the lessees agreed to voluntarily accom-
modate any of Delta’s five flights.118
To address its quandary, Dallas sought the guidance of the
DOT.119 The DOT responded, indicating that Dallas “had legal
obligations to accommodate Delta.”120 Indeed, “[t]he DOT em-
phasized the importance of accommodating a requesting airline
and ensuring competition at this ‘constrained’ airport.”121
111 Id. After its sublease of United’s gates, Southwest then controlled ninety
percent of the gates at Love Field.
112 Id. In addition to disputing the interpretation of the lease agreements as to
whether accommodation was required or merely procedural, Southwest’s CEO,
Gary Kelly, emailed Dallas’s City Manager to drive home Southwest’s point. Id.
Kelly claimed that Dallas “once again . . . ha[d] taken steps to frustrate and im-
pede Southwest Airlines’ growth and success.” Id. Kelly continued, “We thought
that after working so hard to resolve the historic dispute between Dallas and Ft.
Worth over our airports and then investing so massively to reinvent Love Field
that we were finally past these acrimonious hardships with our hometown.” Id.
The email concluded, poignantly, “After 43 years of this, we have ‘Dallas fatigue.’
We are moving on to focus our corporate investments in those markets that place
a value on them and their corporate residents.” Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. (emphasis added); see David Koenig, Southwest Paid $120 Million for 2
Gates at Dallas Airport, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 28, 2015, 8:38 PM), http://big
story.ap.org/article/22c68a3f3ea84a14b608d9b609fb137c/southwest-paid-120-
million-2-gates-dallas-airport [https://perma.cc/3QXG-29YP].
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After failing to act again for almost two months, Dallas
reached out to the DOT in February 2015 to get a second opin-
ion.122 DOT responded in June 2015, reiterating that the city’s
legal obligations required it to accommodate Delta.123 Specifi-
cally, DOT clarified that “[Dallas] is required to accommodate a
requesting carrier unless Love Field’s facilities are fully-utilized
at the time of the request, or the [lessees] at the time are selling
tickets for future flights fully-utilizing the facilities.”124 To deter-
mine whether the facilities were fully-utilized, DOT indicated
that Dallas could not evaluate the lessee airline’s “unscheduled
future expansion plans because it ‘may give a [lessee airline] the
ability to block a competitor’s accommodation request by decid-
ing or asserting, after a request is made, that it will expand ser-
vice.’”125 Nevertheless, despite DOT’s urging, Dallas was unable,
and unwilling, to procure accommodation for Delta from one of
the lessee airlines at Love Field.126
C. DALLAS SEEKS HELP FROM THE FEDERAL COURT
Faced with the termination of Delta’s temporary gate usage
agreement with United on July 6, 2015,127 Dallas filed suit for
declaratory relief in federal court in the Northern District of
Texas.128 Judge Ed Kinkeade, who drew the case, characterized
the city’s suit as a request to “[p]lease tell us what to do.”129
Southwest, Dallas, and Delta all filed cross motions for tempo-
rary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions against each
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. (quoting Letter from Kathryn B. Thomson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Transp., to Peter B. Haskel, Exec. Assistant City Attorney, City of Dall. (June 15,
2015)).
125 Id. (quoting Letter from Kathryn B. Thomson, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of
Transp., to Peter B. Haskel, Exec. Assistant City Attorney, City of Dall. (June 15,
2015)).
126 Id. at *6.
127 Southwest honored Delta’s 180-day temporary gate usage agreement with
United once Southwest started subleasing United’s two gates. Id. However, South-
west refused to extend the temporary gate usage agreement beyond the tempo-
rary agreement’s July 2015 expiration date. Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
516 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
other.130 After three days of hearings in late September 2015,131
the district court ruled in favor of Delta on January 8, 2016.132
Evaluating Delta’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the
court found that Delta had standing to sue for injunctive relief
as a third-party beneficiary of Southwest’s gate lease agreements
with Dallas.133 Moreover, the court held that “Southwest’s sched-
ule would clearly accommodate Delta when it made its initial
request for voluntary accommodation . . . and for several
months after.”134 Therefore, Southwest breached the accommo-
dation provision of its gate lease with Dallas.135
The court further held that denying Delta’s request for in-
junctive relief would eject the carrier from Love Field, causing
Delta to “los[e] business and endure[ ] negative impact to its
name and brand.”136 Accordingly, a substantial threat of irrepa-
rable harm balanced the scales of equity in favor of Delta and
not Southwest.137 Finally, the balance of public interest weighed
in favor of Delta, as “the chaos and inconvenience of disrupted
service by removing Delta from Love Field . . . would be a great
disservice to the public.”138 Because Delta satisfied the four ele-
ments required for a preliminary injunction,139 Judge Kinkeade
granted Delta’s motion and allowed Delta to continue flying
from Love Field, for now.140
Before he concluded the memorandum opinion, however,
Judge Kinkeade made a few prescient observations.
Love Field is unique in that it is the only airport in the United
States that is controlled by a federal statute and is gate-con-
strained, thereby freezing growth. Love Field is in that respect
130 Id.
131 The author’s chance attendance at these hearings spurred the drafting of
this comment.
132 Id. at *1, *6.
133 Id. at *9.
134 Id. at *11.
135 Id.
136 Id. at *13.
137 Id.
138 Id. at *14.
139 Id. at *6 (citing Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572
(5th Cir. 1974) (noting that “[t]o be entitled to a preliminary injunction, the
movant must satisfy each of the following equitable factors: (1) a substantial like-
lihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3)
the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the threatened harm to the party
sought to be enjoined; and (4) granting the injunctive relief will not disserve the
public interest.”)).
140 Id. at *14.
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the most unique airport in the world; no other airport has to
deal with Congressionally mandated no-growth and limited
hourly flight restrictions. . . . To change this no-growth situation
at Love Field, Congress will need to act. The political powers-
that-be can address and correct these issues that face Love Field
and new entrant airlines through repealing legislation unique to
this airport. Without this change, new entrant airlines, [Dallas],
[lessee airlines], and the citizens of Dallas will continue to face
dilemmas like this one. The flying public deserves more courage
from its elected officials about travel to and from Love Field. The
time for these elected officials to consider an end to all con-
straints on Love Field is now.141
IV. WRANGLING WITH WRIGHT:
THE VALIDITY OF WARA
The current, gate-constrained state of Love Field is untenable.
However, the available avenues of challenging WARA in the
courts are narrow and few. Because of the broad powers con-
ferred under the Commerce Clause, WARA is not particularly
susceptible to traditional constitutional attacks.142 To date,
WARA’s beneficiaries have successfully weathered antitrust
claims alleging monopoly at Love Field.143 Moreover, though
the contract and tort claims working their way through the
Northern District of Texas may yet yield fruit,144 WARA, the Five
Party Agreement, and the Love Field leases’ accommodation
provisions do not provide a workable and sustainable solution
for encouraging long-term competition and growth at Love
Field. Nonetheless, these potential legal challenges to the valid-
ity of WARA deserve some consideration.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WARA
The constitutionality of the Wright Amendment and its prog-
eny has not yet been successfully challenged.145 In Cramer v. Skin-
ner, the Fifth Circuit considered claims that the Wright
Amendment unconstitutionally restricted interstate travel.146
141 Id. at *15–16.
142 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
143 See Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dallas, 527 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543
(N.D. Tex. 2007).
144 See, e.g., Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at *1, *14.
145 See Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Cramer v.
Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1032–33 (5th Cir. 1991); Delta Airlines, 2016 WL 98604, at
*15.
146 Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1022.
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The plaintiff claimed that the Wright Amendment violated fun-
damental rights under several provisions of the Constitution147
and that Congress did not have a compelling interest to justify
those violations.148 However, the court affirmed summary judg-
ment against the plaintiff on his right to interstate travel
claim.149 Citing City of Houston v. Federal Aviation Administra-
tion,150 the court held that the Wright Amendment does not bar
travelers from flying and merely makes travel to and from Love
Field less convenient.151 The D.C. Circuit considered a similar
case in Kansas v. United States and ruled the same way.152 Because
WARA arguably makes travel to and from Love Field more con-
venient than it was under the Wright Amendment, challenging
WARA under an interstate travel theory is even less likely to gain
any traction with the courts.
Another possible, but likely ill-fated, constitutional argument
may be made under the Commerce Clause. Article I provides
that Congress may “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”153 “[I]t is . . . well established that Congress has broad
authority under the Clause.”154 Congress’s power to regulate in-
terstate commerce is not just limited to commerce among the
states, “but extends to activities that ‘have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.’”155
A Commerce Clause challenge to WARA would almost cer-
tainly fail because WARA implicates one of the most basic forms
of interstate commerce: the commercial movement of persons
across state lines.156 Accordingly, overruling WARA on the basis
of a constitutional defect is largely impracticable.
147 Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the Wright Amendment violated the
Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V; the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; the Assembly Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I; and the
Port Preference Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. Cramer, 931 F2d at 1029–30.
148 Id. at 1030.
149 Id. at 1032–33.
150 City of Houston v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 679 F.2d 1184, 1198 (5th Cir.
1982) (upholding perimeter restrictions at Washington’s National Airport).
151 Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1030.
152 Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
153 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
154 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012).
155 Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 110, 118–19 (1941)).
156 See Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, § 3, 120
Stat. 2011, 2011 (2006).
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B. ANTITRUST AVENUES
Another legal challenge may arise under WARA from the
field of antitrust. However, this route has already been at-
tempted by former Love Field leaseholders who leased premises
near the soon-to-be demolished gates prior to the gate reduc-
tion at the airport.157 In Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dal-
las, the leaseholders alleged several antitrust claims under the
Sherman Act against the five signatories of the Five Party Agree-
ment.158 The defendants countered that their conduct in urging
the passage of WARA was protected under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.159
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
agreed and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim.160 First, the court held that defendants’ pur-
pose in executing the Five Party Agreement, as it appeared on
the face of the plaintiffs’ complaint, was “to effect the amend-
ment and eventual repeal of the Wright Amendment.”161 Sec-
ond, the court further held that the defendants’ conduct in
discussing and drafting the Five Party Agreement was also pro-
tected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, even though the
plaintiffs pleaded that defendants’ conduct was clandestine and
patently anticompetitive.162 Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to state
any claim regarding the defendants’ pre-WARA conduct that
was not protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.163
157 See Love Terminal Partners, L.P. v. City of Dallas, 527 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543
(N.D. Tex. 2007).
158 Id. at 547.
159 Id. at 548. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is derived from two seminal anti-
trust cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961), and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
The doctrine provides that “parties who petition the government for governmen-
tal action favorable to them cannot be prosecuted under the antitrust laws even
though their petitions are motivated by anticompetitive intent.” Video Int’l Prod.,
Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988).
“Noerr-Pennington immunity also applies when private parties conspire with gov-
ernment officials to achieve the desired anticompetitive result.” Love Terminal
Partners, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (citing City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Ad-
vert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379–80 (1991)).
160 Love Terminal Partners, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
161 Id. at 552.
162 Id. at 553–54 (“Even assuming that some meetings during this period were
clandestine, this fact is simply immaterial for purposes of applying Noerr-
Pennington.”).
163 Id. at 557.
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Most alarming, however, was the court’s discussion of the de-
fendants’ post-WARA conduct.164 First, as a threshold matter,
the court held that the Five Party Agreement fell under the pro-
tection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and, therefore, could
not be held void for violating antitrust law.165 Second, the court
observed that WARA “compels [the] defendants to implement
the terms of the [Five Party Agreement].”166 Finally, the court
found that the Sherman Act167 could coexist with WARA,168
thereby absolving the defendants of antitrust liability for their
continuing compliance with and conduct under WARA, regard-
less of whether such compliance or conduct is manifestly
anticompetitive.169
While WARA may be susceptible to novel antitrust claims be-
yond the scope of this comment, Love Terminal Partners suggests
that any antitrust challenge to the Five Party Agreement or the
lessee airlines’ conduct under that agreement will likely fall on
deaf ears before the federal judiciary.170
C. CONTRACT AND TORT CLAIMS
Although Delta’s five daily flights out of Love Field lived to fly
another day after Judge Kinkeade’s ruling on the airline’s mo-
tion for preliminary injunction,171 the future of Delta’s contract
164 See id. at 557–61.
165 Id. at 558.
166 See id. at 558–60.
167 “The Sherman Act broadly prohibits contracts, combinations, or conspira-
cies in restraint of trade.” Id. at 560 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1).
168 The court summarized the tension between antitrust law and WARA as
follows:
By reducing the flight output at Love Field through a 20-gate re-
striction, allocating the gates at Love Field to uphold Southwest’s
dominance over the short-haul market, and requiring that the
[plaintiffs’] Terminal be demolished, [WARA] almost undoubtedly
conflicts with the Sherman Act. But the Sherman Act and [WARA]
are capable of coexistence. Considered together, it is clear that
Congress intends as the default rule that anticompetitive conduct
be broadly prohibited by law. But in the case of airline competition in
the North Texas region, Congress is willing to tolerate and sanction some
anticompetitive behavior as a means of effecting the eventual end to the
Wright Amendment restrictions that hamstring domestic flights to and from
Love Field.
Id. (emphasis added).
169 Id. at 560–61.
170 See id. at 543.
171 See City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2069-K, 2016 WL 98604,
at *1, *14 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016).
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and tort claims has not yet landed.172 Although the court found
that “Delta . . . show[ed] a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits of its (1) breach of contract claim against Southwest
and (2) declaratory judgment claim that it is entitled to be ac-
commodated by Southwest,”173 the fact that Delta was granted
injunctive relief does not ensure success on the merits at trial.174
It will likely be years until Delta’s challenge even makes it to
trial, and then longer still as the trial decision makes its way
through the appeal process. Given the length, cost, and inher-
ent uncertainty of litigation, challenges to the lessee airlines’
conduct under traditional contract and tort claims do not pro-
vide a satisfactory vehicle to promote competition at Love Field.
Instead, congressional action is required.
V. WRIGHT IS STILL WRONG: BACK TO
THE DRAWING BOARD
In the absence of judicial action to set aside WARA’s arbitrary
gate constraints, the flying public must look to Congress to go
back to the drawing board and re-reform the Wright Amend-
ment. Legislative action is necessary because while fares to and
from North Texas have fallen dramatically since WARA took ef-
fect in 2014, fares could be even lower.175 Moreover, Love
Field’s growth is now capped at twenty gates; future growth will
have to come from the airlines adding more flights to, or flying
larger planes from, those twenty gates.176 Many other American
cities have two or more airports that do not require congres-
sional hand-holding to balance growth and competition in their
respective markets.177 This section of the comment will look to
one of those cities as an example for a new Wright-less path for-
ward for Love Field and DFW.
172 See id. at *7.
173 Id. at *12.
174 See id. at *15 (“As previously stated, none of these factual findings and/or
conclusions of law are binding at a trial on the merits.”).
175 See Andrea Ahles, North Texas Airfares Down Dramatically Since Wright Amend-
ment Ended, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (Jan. 20, 2016, 2:29 PM), http://www
.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/sky-talk-blog/article55663375.html
[https://perma.cc/3CFB-NYZ7].
176 Sheryl Jean, After Wright, All’s Right for Airlines, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Oct.
13, 2015, 9:14 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airline-industry/2015
1012-after-wright-alls-right.ece [https://perma.cc/VW7C-FA38].
177 See, e.g., CHI. DEP’T OF AVIATION, http://www.flychicago.com/Pages/Land
ingPage.aspx [https://perma.cc/RLB9-ZT5M].
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A. WARA HAS INCREASED CONVENIENCE AND LOWERED FARES,
BUT AT WHAT COST TO THE CONSUMER?
Since WARA took effect in October 2014, the airlines have
certainly benefited.178 But has the flying public? The answer has
been a resounding yes.179 In addition to new flights to new desti-
nations,180 North Texans have seen lower fares.181 Fares to or
from Love Field and DFW fell thirteen percent from late 2013 to
late 2014.182 And fares continue to drop.183 As of January 2016,
average airfares in the North Texas region were at their cheap-
est since 2010.184
However, it is important to note that WARA’s lifting of flight
restrictions from Love Field has coincided with another power-
ful factor that drives down airfares: falling oil prices.185 Moreo-
ver, Southwest’s primary competitor in the market, American,
has “aggressively lowered fares at DFW when its flights compete
against a low-cost carrier such as Spirit or Frontier.”186 With de-
clining jet fuel prices and the arrival of low-cost carriers at DFW,
WARA’s correlation with lower fares appears more tenuous. As
there is no guarantee that oil prices will stay down, WARA’s hon-
eymoon period with the flying public may come to an end when
airfares eventually increase.
If and when fares do increase, travelers to and from Love
Field will be at a disadvantage because of WARA’s anticompeti-
tive gate restrictions. “Competition helps keep fares reasona-
178 See Jean, supra note 176 (“Passenger traffic at Love jumped nearly 88 per-
cent—or 607,249 more people—from September 2014 through August [2015].
Southwest accounted for 90 percent of that increase, with its traffic up 79
percent.”).
179 See Ahles, supra note 175; Jean, supra note 176.
180 Jean, supra note 176 (“Southwest . . . expanded from 118 departures to 16
cities before Oct. 13, 2014, to 180 flights to 50 cities [in October 2015].”).
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See Ahles, supra note 175 (“According to government data released [in Janu-
ary 2016], average fares at Love Field dropped 6.5 percent in the second quarter
of 2015, compared with the same period of 2014, as [Southwest] added nonstop
routes and flights. To compete, [American] and other carriers lowered their
prices at [DFW], driving average airfares down at the region’s major airport by 6
percent during the period.”).
184 Id. (“[F]ares have dropped anywhere from 3 to 48 percent on [Southwest’s
fifteen new nonstop] routes out of Love Field and 3 to 26 percent on the same
routes out of DFW.”).
185 Id.
186 Id.
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ble.”187 If more airlines were permitted to fly from Love Field,
airfares could be even lower and consumers would have even
more route choices.188 As it stands, however, the gate restrictions
at Love Field and the physical impossibility of flying more than a
certain number of flights per day from those gates will continue
to limit the number of airlines that can fly from the airport. As
such, Love Field’s growth may plateau as early as 2019.189 With-
out competition and growth, consumers flying to or from Love
Field will be at the mercy of fluctuating fuel prices and subject
to the whim of those lessee airlines lucky enough to possess any
of Love Field’s precious gates.
B. THE APPROACH OF ANOTHER MULTI-AIRPORT CITY
The driving force behind Congress’s meddling at Love Field
has always been a concern for the competiveness of DFW. Con-
gress posits that an unrestrained Love Field would take too
many customers and flights away from DFW because Love Field
is more conveniently located near downtown Dallas.190 However,
the elimination of the Wright Amendment’s flight restrictions
under WARA has shaken this line of thinking. Since WARA took
effect in October 2014, DFW “saw 592,617 more passengers, up
11 percent from September 2014 to August [2015].”191 Moreo-
ver, despite increased competition from Love Field, DFW re-
mains the busiest airport in North Texas.192 In August 2015,
DFW received more than 5.8 million passengers to Love Field’s
1.3 million.193 The gap between DFW and Love Field is unlikely
to close any time soon.194 In addition to WARA’s gate restric-
tions, Love Field is further limited by its proximity to residential
areas, local noise ordinances, and a lack of adequate parking
facilities.195 In short, DFW has come of age and no longer re-
quires congressional supervision to make its way in the world. A
brief overview of another multi-airport city whose airports are
not limited by national legislation demonstrates that DFW and
187 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
188 Id.
189 Jean, supra note 176.
190 See supra Part II.B.
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Love Field can successfully grow and coexist in a WARA-less
future.
1. Chicago, Illinois
Chicago, Illinois, has two major airports: O’Hare Interna-
tional Airport (O’Hare) and Midway International Airport
(Midway).196 The two airports are approximately twenty-eight
miles from one another, and Midway is approximately eight
miles closer to downtown Chicago than O’Hare.197 O’Hare has
189 gates, the majority of which are leased to United (seventy-
nine gates) and American (sixty-eight gates).198 Midway has
forty-three gates,199 thirty-five of which are used by Southwest.200
In 2015, almost 77 million passengers passed through
O’Hare.201 More than 22 million passed through Midway during
the same period.202 Congress has imposed no limit on the num-
ber of gates that may be built at either O’Hare or Midway.
The current balance between O’Hare and Midway could be a
preview of air travel in the Dallas-Fort Worth region in a WARA-
less future. O’Hare clearly remains successful despite the close
proximity of another competing airport.203 Further, Midway’s 22
196 See CHI. DEP’T OF AVIATION, supra note 177.
197 Driving Directions from Chicago Midway Airport to O’Hare Int’l Airport,
GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Midway+International+Air
port,+South+Cierro+Avenue,+Chicago,+IL/O%E2%80%99Hare+International+
Airport [https://perma.cc/2HN4-A3W7]; Chicago O’Hare Airport to and from
Chicago Downtown, CRSA.COM, http://www.clinicalrobotics.com/index.php/
crsa-2009-chicago/chicago-ohare-airport-to-and-from-chicago-downtown/
[https://perma.cc/S6FD-Q4X6]; Carol Luther, The Best Way to Get to Chicago
Union Station from Chicago Midway Airport, USA TODAY, http://traveltips.usatoday
.com/way-chicago-union-station-chicago-midway-airport-43702.html [https://per
ma.cc/V5H7-B76G].
198 Facility Data, CHI. DEP’T OF AVIATION, http://www.flychicago.com/OHare/
EN/AboutUs/Facts/Pages/Facility-Data.aspx [https://perma.cc/T6XH-RC5R].
199 Id.
200 Airport Information, SOUTHWEST, https://www.southwest.com/html/air/air-
port-information.html [https://perma.cc/9SEM-94FM].
201 Monthly Operations, Passengers, Cargo Summary by Class for December 2015:




202 Monthly Operations, Passengers, Cargo Summary by Class for December 2015: Mid-
way Airport, CHI. DEP’T OF AVIATION (2016), http://www.flychicago.com/SiteCol
lectionDocuments/OHare/AboutUs/Facts%20and%20Figures/Air%20Traffic%
20Data/1215%20MDW%20SUMMARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8NH-Q2GJ].
203 O’Hare is one of the world’s busiest airports. See Gregory Karp, O’Hare Re-
gains Title of World’s Busiest Airport, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 21, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://
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million passengers in 2015 dramatically surpass the 14 million
who flew through Love Field in the same year.204 The balance of
passenger traffic through Chicago’s two major airports demon-
strates that an increase in the number of gates and a possible
attending increase in the number of passengers at Love Field
would not greatly shift the competitive balance between Love
Field and DFW.
C. THE PATH FORWARD
WARA’s gate restriction is arbitrary and rooted in an outdated
analysis. DFW is now one of the busiest airports in the world; it
no longer requires the kind of congressional oversight that the
Wright Amendment embodied. Love Field may be thriving in
the absence of the Wright Amendment’s geographical restric-
tions, but the thriving business at Love Field faces a hard cap in
the next decade. Unless the airlines can find a way to accommo-
date more flights at the limited number of gates allowed at Love
Field under WARA, there will be no other way for the airport to
accommodate more passengers or additional new entrant air-
lines. This cap on competition will inevitably lead to higher fares
for the consumer and more litigation between the entrant air-
lines struggling to get a finger-hold at Love Field. This situation
is untenable and requires action.
Unfortunately, as discussed earlier in the comment, there is
little chance that WARA or the conduct of the lessee airlines
under the law can be efficiently and effectively challenged in the
courts.205 WARA is likely constitutional, the law protects the
lessee airlines acting pursuant to it from antitrust liability, and
the contract or tort claims that might be made against the cur-
rent lessee airlines will demand years of litigation with no guar-
anteed outcome. If passengers or entrant airlines cannot
challenge WARA judicially, then they must go to the source of
the law for change: Congress.
Unfortunately, Congress is unlikely to repeal WARA in the
near future. Absent a change of heart from one of the airlines
that is a party to the Five Party Agreement, either Southwest or
American, Congress will likely continue to honor the Five Party
www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-ohare-busiest-airport-0122-biz-20150121-
story.html [https://perma.cc/5TMW-6ZCN].
204 Dallas Love Field Total Passengers: December 2015, DALL. LOVE FIELD (2015),
http://www.dallas-lovefield.com/pdf/statistics/201512AircraftActivity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8AW6-8T5G].
205 See supra Part IV.
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Agreement that spurred the passage of WARA. It will probably
take the fruition of the outcomes enumerated supra to move
either the airlines or a sufficient number of the flying public to
urge Congress to re-reform the Wright Amendment. Until that
day, however, the lessee airlines and Delta will continue to move
as many people as possible through an inadequate number of
gates.
VI. CONCLUSION
WARA was born of a noble purpose: to free Love Field from
the restrictive grasp of the Wright Amendment. The Wright
Amendment served its purpose for almost a quarter century by
allowing DFW to grow unfettered by tangible competition for
interstate flights from nearby Love Field. However, DFW has
now come of age. It is among the busiest airports in the world
and continues to grow even in the face of increased competition
from Love Field. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary that DFW
receive preferential treatment from Congress in the form of re-
strictions on Love Field.
Nonetheless, the Five Party Agreement and its progeny,
WARA, continue to restrain Love Field. What has issued from
the Five Party Agreement and WARA is “a game of musical
chairs with Love Field gate space.”206
Through WARA’s gate restrictions, Congress has codified an
untenable status quo. Southwest will continue to dominate Love
Field because it controls ninety percent of the airport’s gates.
Virgin will continue to have two gates. But any other airline that
attempts to compete at Love Field will be forced to seek accom-
modation with the city of Dallas, which has shown itself to be an
inept conduit for fostering competition at Love Field. When
faced with Delta’s accommodation requests in 2014 and 2015,
the city tucked tail and ran, first to the DOT, which twice re-
minded the city of its legal obligations to accommodate Delta,
and then to the federal court, which will spend the next several
years trying to do what the city could not: enforcing Delta’s ac-
commodation at Love Field. Any other airline even considering
an attempt to compete at Love Field would be foolish to try now,
206 City of Dallas v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-2069-K, 2016 WL 98604, at
*12 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016) (“The Court finds Southwest and [Dallas] are play-
ing a game of musical chairs with Love Field gate space, and with Virgin’s ‘chairs’
not in play in this game, there’s no ‘chair’ for Delta—Southwest occupies all 18
gates and the City consents.”).
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given that such an attempt will almost certainly spell years of
litigation with no certain outcome.
The dearth of competition at Love Field will eventually mani-
fest itself in the form of higher fares for the consumer. Cur-
rently, Love Field is thriving without the geographic restrictions
of the Wright Amendment. The enactment of WARA, coincid-
ing with falling oil prices, has driven down North Texas airfares
to their lowest mark in six years. Times will not always be so
good and jet fuel prices will likely rise again. In the absence of
competition at Love Field, what impetus do the lessee airlines
have not to pass all rising costs to the consumer?
WARA is flawed and requires reformation or repeal. However,
the route to change is littered with obstacles. A constitutional
attack on the law is unlikely to succeed: Congress’s power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause is too
broad and WARA does not seem to violate any constitutional
rights. An attack on the Five Party Agreement under antitrust
principles also appears barred. This leaves only one route to
challenging WARA: Congress.
Unfortunately, congressional action to reform or repeal
WARA is unlikely in the near term. Unless Southwest or Ameri-
can denounces the Five Party Agreement, Congress will con-
tinue to bow to the wishes of the contracting parties. Southwest
seems content for the moment with the outcome of WARA; the
airline’s current focus is on expelling Delta from Love Field so
that it can fully utilize its eighteen gates. There is no indication
that American would advocate an increase in the number of
gates at Love Field, since any increase in capacity at Love Field is
a potential threat to American’s hub at DFW. Accordingly, ab-
sent a catastrophic accident caused by too many aircraft trying
to deplane and enplane at too few gates, the status quo under
WARA will likely continue for the foreseeable future.
